There Is More to Come: The Analytical Dynamics of Human Rights and Social Need by Stewart B. Whitney
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 24 
Number 1 Volume 24, Winter 1978, Number 1 Article 3 
April 2017 
There Is More to Come: The Analytical Dynamics of Human Rights 
and Social Need 
Stewart B. Whitney 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Human Rights Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stewart B. Whitney (1978) "There Is More to Come: The Analytical Dynamics of Human Rights and Social 
Need," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 24 : No. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol24/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 






Let us hope that the grace of understanding may be vouchsafed us and that
we may choose, before it is too late, the right road-the road that leads not
to death, but to the further realization of man's unique creative mission on
this planet!'
-Pitirim A. Sorokin, 1957
INTRODUCTION: THE PROMISE
In Ecclesiastes appears the passage:
Vanity of vanities; all is vanity . . . . There is no new thing. under the sun
. . . there is no remembrance of former things; neither shall there be any
remembrance of things that are to come with those that shall come after.
History knows no end; its construction proceeds through Epochs and
catastrophies. Man, as the actor, merely adapts to the changing conditions
of the times. If, however, one assumes social life to be an organic historical
process, then man is the symbol and meaning of this adaptation and
change.
While the degree of adaptation and change fluctuates throughout the
Epochs of man, our Epoch contains marked change in accelerated and
intensive fashion. As Sir Julian Huxley has stated:
The most bewildering characteristic of the present moment of history is that
things are happening faster and faster. The pace of change in human affairs,
originally so slow as to be unnoticed, has steadily accelerated, until today we
can no longer measure it in terms of generations: Major changes now take
place every few years and human individuals have to make several drastic
adjustments in the course of their working lives . . . . Change today is dis-
ruptive; its trends are diverging in various directions. What is more, many
of them are self-limiting or even self-destructive.'
I A Paper presented at the Third Annual Symposium of The Philosophy of Human Rights,
Niagara University (April 26, 1978).
P. SOROKIN, THE CRISIS OF OUR AGE: THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL OUTLOOK (1941).
2 J. HUXLEY, THE CRISIS IN MAN'S DESTINY (1943).
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HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL NEED
Here, Huxley attempts to analyze the relationship between social
change and the analytical dynamics of human rights and social need. The
realization of the praxis of the Democratic Community, however, can sur-
vive the disintegration of the principles of social order if it be recognized
that the struggle to freedom is the call of that survival.3
COMMUNITY: THE ADAPTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL NEED
Community presupposes the realization of certain principles in social
action, viz. the praxis of human rights and social need. Participation de-
mands responsibility and reciprocity; meaning requires integration.
Basic Principles
Archaeological and ethnographic evidence suggest that cooperation is
the basis of maintaining social life.4 Socialization and social control are
basic processes that enable the Community to maintain its social bonds.
By maintaining these bonds through regulation of a code of ethics, the
Community is able to structure social life so as to satisfy the rights and
needs of its participants. These processes regulate the behavior of the
participants in codified ways. As Margaret Mead notes:
When we examine how any society works, it becomes clear that it is precisely
the basic taboos-the deeply and intensely felt prohibitions against
'unthinkable' behavior-that keep the social system in balance . . . the
taboo lies much deeper in our consciousness, and by prohibiting certain forms
of behavior also affirms what we hold most precious in our human relation-
ships.$
Responsibility and reciprocity are two basic principles of social life;
without them, a Community perishes. They regulate the internalization of
the code of ethics; the relationship between the sexes and the cooperative
means by which the Community solves its basic and recurring problems.
Finally, they give meaning to the members in the praxis of human rights
and social need.
Responsibility
The responsibility for Community cooperation has its own intrinsic
morality! Moral solidarity is characteristic of the "conscience collective"
or the spirit of shared symbols and meanings among Community members.
Moral solidarity, however, is dependent upon the internalization, exercise
In addition to the sociological studies of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, the work by
Elwin H. Powell is a probative and rather definitive statement about the dynamics of social
order. See E. POWELL, THE DESIGN OF DISCORD: STUDIES OF ANOMIE (1970).
1 See R. LEAKEY & R. LEWIN, ORIGINS (1977); Klein, The Ecology of Early Man in Southern
Africa, SCIENCE, July 8, 1977, at 115-126.
Mead, A Proposal: We Need Taboos On Sex At Work, REDBOOK, April 1978, at 31.
See E. DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY (J. Spaulding & G. Simpson trans. 1951).
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and configuration of each member. Each member shares in the responsibil-
ity to realize Community.
The process of Community necessitates both conscriptual and voli-
tional obligations among its members. The social action of fulfilling obliga-
tions depends upon a sense of respect for all members; a kind of friendship
and regard of persons independent of intimacy and status. To realize re-
sponsibility, a member must react to a situation defined for response; it is
a form of social interaction basic for social order.7 By virtue of membership
in a Community, a person is given responsibility.
The process of responsibility involves several "decisive factors."' Ini-
tially, a member confronts an "inward measuring up," whereby he assesses
the necessity of personal compliance with social demands. Secondly, he
develops a sense of maturity or awareness of the meaning of his obligations.
Finally, a member senses and feels responsibility for the consequences of
his action. This ethic of responsibility, however, is separate from social
action; responsibility precedes action. To respond with responsibility is to
share directly in Community with other responsible members.
Anthropological research contains extensive data that reveal the basic
importance of the responsibility principle. It is within this available re-
source material that one discovers the interdependence of responsibility
and behavior. In traditional society individuality is not distinguished;
Community requires universal oneness and unity.' Responsibility is sacred
in meaning, and suggests the most intense social experience. In this sense,
responsibility assumes accountability to all members of the band through
mutual trust. As has been aptly stated: "It is only the ignorant person that
sees many where there is really only one."' 0
Reciprocity
In the Community, the principles of responsibility and reciprocity are
interdependent. Responsibility is the spirit of social action while reciproc-
ity defines the form.
According to Alvin W. Gouldner, L.T. Hobhouse holds that
"reciprocity . . . is the vital principle of society."" It is the key process
through which shared social rules are enabled to yield social stability."2
Gouldner further notes that Richard Thurnwald emphasizes the "principle
of reciprocity." According to Thurnwald, "[t]his principle is almost a
See H. NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF 61-65 (1963).
See H. GERTH & C. MILLS, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 126-28 (1958).
The basis of community is described throughout the classic studies of traditional societies;
Trobriand Islanders, Maya, Cuna Indians, Dakota, Eskimo, et. al. For a contemporary study,
see S. WHITNEY, ECOLOGY AND CULTURAL IDENTITY AMONG ESKIMOS (1973).
j. NIEHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKS (1961).
" L. HOBHOUSE, MORALS IN EVOLUTION: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE ETHICS (1951).
12 For a first rate exploratory statement on the principle of reciprocity, see Gouldner, The
Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 1960 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 161-78.
The author is especially indebted to Gouldner's statement and its suggestions.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL NEED
primordial imperative which 'pervades every relation of primitive life' and
is the basis on which the entire social and ethical life of primitive civiliza-
tions presumably rests."'3 Georg Simmel further suggests that reciprocity
is the basis not only for traditional but for all societies. Social cohesion
cannot exist without "the reciprocity of service and return service."'" As
Simmel contends, "[aill contracts among men rest on the schema of
giving and returning the equivalence."' 5
The social exchange theories of Gouldner, Anthony Heath, and George
Homans emphasize the importance of reciprocity in social life by suggest-
ing that the mutually contingent exchange of benefits between two or more
units is necessary for Community survival and maintenance." Gouldner's
position is that other theories focus on a typology of reciprocity: religious,
economic, and sexual. 7 Kingsley Davis suggests that the incest taboo func-
tions to prevent sexual exploitation, or the practice of unequal exchange.
Davis adds that "Illegitimate sexual relations ordinarily involve a certain
amount of' reciprocity. Sex is exchanged for something equally valuable
"I8
Although not all social relations are intimate in nature, reciprocity is
the major form of social cohesion. "It is the nature of social interaction,"
notes Talcott Parsons, "that the gratification of ego's need-disposition is
contingent on alter's reaction and vice-versa." A member of the Com-
munity has "rights of gratification which are dependent on the responsibil-
ities" of the other members. Rights imply responsibilities, and in the Com-
munity they are transitive. Reciprocity implies that each member has
rights and responsibilities.
In traditional society conformity is sanctioned by the social structure.
Branislaw Malinowski suggests that members owe obligations to each
other and conformity with norms is something they give to each other.
Reciprocity is "associated with definite social ties . . . a mutual depend-
ence and realized in the equivalent arrangement of reciprocal services.""
Reciprocity, then, is the mutually gratifying pattern of exchanging feel-
ings, goods and services.
Community and Responsibility
The principles of responsibility and reciprocity are universal. They
occur, however, through socialization, which internalizes complementary
IR. THURNWALD, ECONOMICS IN PRIMrrivE COMMUNITIES 106, 137 (1932).
" E. SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 387 (1950).
Id.
" See Homans, Social Behavior as Exchange, 1958 AMEIcAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 597-606.
,7 Gouldner cites C. L.vI-STRAUSS, LES STUCTURES ELEMENTAIRES DE LA PARENTE (1949), R.
FIRTH, PRIMITIVE POLYNESIAN ECONOMY (1950), and MAN AND CULTURE: AN EVALUATION OF THE
WORK OF BRANISLAW MALINOWSKI (R. Firth ed. 1957).
" K. DAVIS, HUMAN SOCIETY 403-04 (1949).
" T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 21 (1951).
"B. MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 55 (1926).
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rights and obligations in members, before they assume responsible partici-
pation in the Community. The norms of responsibility and reciprocity
structure social relations as adaptation to compliance and maintenance of
social stability.
One becomes a member of the Community by taking the role of the
"others" implicated with him in Community activity. He does this by
* imaginatively assuming the position or point of view of another member.
Attitudes constitute a significant part of the role of the other. By taking
the role of the other, the new member acquires a complex of beliefs, feel-
ings and information which enable him to comprehend, evaluate and relate
to the world. Taking the role involves the process of reflection. George
Herbert Mead suggests that the process of reflection arises in social behav-
ior."' Reflection involves the development of a self-concept-an individ-
ual's image or set of attitudes of himself which he derives from social
experience. As John Kinch states: "The self-concept is that organization
of qualities that the individual attributes to himself. "n
As a member participates in the Community, he engages-in continu-
ous role-taking experiences. He develops self-consciousness. "Only in so far
as he belongs toward the organized, cooperative social activity, or set of
such activities in which that group as such is engaged," states Mead, "does
he develop a complete self or possess the sort of complete self he has
developed." In this way participants begin to define themselves as mem-
bers of the Community. This process permeates the entire complex of
orientations regarding their world, including their views toward their roles.
Included in this complex of orientations are the elements of loyalty to the
Community, identification with other members of the Community, knowl-
edge about the Community, and a self-image of rights and obligations in
the Community.
The development of the Community self, which consists of organizing
the social attitudes of the Community to which the person is. a member is
two-fold. It reaches its full development by organizing the individual atti-
tudes of other members into organized group attitudes and by becoming
an individual reflection of the general systematic pattern of behavior in
which it and others are involved u Community members acquire Com-
munity mentalities or mental pictures that form and interpret the world.
The Community self develops through responsible and reciprocal Com-
munity participation, and sustains itself in the Community culture. As a
member acquires loyalty and identification, he learns to conform to the
principles, norms and attitudes of the members and to act discriminately
toward non-members.
21 See G. MEAD, MIND, SELF AND SocIETY 354-78 (1934).
Kinch, A Formalized Theory of the Self-Concept, AMEWCAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Jan.,
1963, at 481 (emphasis in original).
2 G. MEAD, supra note 21, at 155.
24 See A. STRAuss, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GEORGE HERTmr MEAD 235 (1971).
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SocIAL NEED
Community members build strong bonds and solidarity accompanied
by an intense sense of belonging. Participation in the Community,
Gemeinschaft, provides members with meaning, identity and solidarity; it
functions to sustain the individual in his day-to-day life.
SociETY: THE EROSION OF COMMUNITY
Industrialization and secularization accompanied by increased differ-
entiation, privatization and atomization of bourgeois society have brought
about conditions that tend to erode the basic needs of Community, includ-
ing the principles of responsibility and the norms of rights and obligations.
Unfolding of the Unthinkable
A dramatic confrontation with the possible expendability of life repre-
sents the dramatic struggle of the 20th century. Herbert Marcuse notes
that in contemporary society, one witnesses "the union of growing produc-
tivity and growing destruction; the brinkmanship of annihilation; the sur-
render of thought, hope, and fear to the decisions of the powers that be;
the preservation of misery in the face of unprecedented wealth."
The struggle seems to have accelerated to such global significance
today that one cannot dismiss the ominous conclusion of The Club of
Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind:
(1) If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pol-
lution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the lim-
its to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next one
hundred years.
(2) The basic behavior mode of the world system is exponential growth of
population and capital, followed by collapse."
In Our Threatened Planet, Joseph F. Goodavage predicts that "the
winter of 1981 to be one of the worst on record. It will be a true deep freeze,
and it's a harbinger of the winter of the '80's-which will become increas-
ingly intense, climaxing in the late '80's with the most disastrous deep
freeze in history."" This prediction is hardly comforting to those of us who
live in the Frost Belt, and the possibility of cataclysmic weather and its
consequences is threatening to all.
The polemics of environmental struggle mask the grave danger to our
lives, i.e., the possibility of the loss of Community.
Rise of the State
Loss of Community occurs with the rise of the State, viz., the develop-
ment of an institutionalized form of power designed to cope with the envi-
ronmental struggle.
H. MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN XI (1964).
" D. MEADows, THE LIMrrs To GRowTH 29 (1972).
J. GOODAVAGE, OUR THREATENED PLANET (1977).
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Centralization of institutionalized political-economic power, i.e., the
State, accompanies the growth of agritechnology and industrialization.
The State is nurtured as Community principles and norms are displaced
from the properties of the people and claimed as codified norms of estab-
lished society. The struggle between Community and State threatens the
viability of norms, especially as the State attempts to increase self-
sufficiency by enlarging the area under its control. Using the tools of power
and secrecy, the foundations of the totalitarian State, the State is able to
assume command of society with the aim of social control pervasive in the
totality of social reality.
According to Elwin H. Powell, the totalitarian States use police power
to suppress rebellion: To be effective, the State's power must be legiti-
mated by value-consensus and must function to provide security for its
members; it rules the oppressed only so long as the oppressed submit to
its authority voluntarily. In other words, the power of the State is propor-
tionate to the impotence of the people.
The tyranny of the State rests on its isolation from the people and the
isolation of people from each other through mutual fear and suspicion.
This process contradicts the essential Community condition of plurality
and organization; it threatens the basic unit of membership. As Powell
states:
Government is an Idea, not a thing. Not the building but the document
contains the idea which runs the machinery of State. When the State is losing
legitimacy, when it is no longer supported by the consent of the governed,
then it resorts to secrecy and deceit.2
As isolation becomes increasingly pervasive, people lose claim to the
legitimacy of accountability which results in a runaway tyranny. As John
Herz contends:
[It] renders obsolete traditional defense structures, bypasses the protective
shell of the state. Paradoxically utmost strength now coincides in the same
unit with utmost vulnerability, absolute power with utter impotence .. .
nothing short of global rule can satisfy the security interest of any one power
• . .each superpower's logical objective is the destruction of the other ....
Now that destruction threatens everybody, the common interest of all man-
kind is in sheer survival.2
Loss of Self
A psychological adaptation to the condition of isolation and separa-
tion from Community standards accompanies the rise of the State. At its
roots is the zealous pursuit of individual freedom from internal conditions
and external controls. This process, however, presupposes self-discipline
u E. POWELL, PROMOTING THE DECLINE OF THE RISING STATE 31 (1970). This unpublished
manuscript is not only a viable research source but also inspirational for those who choose to
be witnesses of the 20th century.
a Herz, The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State, 1957 WORLD POLmcs 473.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL NEED
and self-direction free from the constraints of the oppressive State, and it
lies at the base of self-liberation.
Self-liberation is a popular style in contemporary society; it offers
solace to those anxious and uneasy about the loss of Community. While
individualized and privatized activities are thought to give meaning to
otherwise dull and empty lives, they in fact facilitate impotence. Since
doing it yourself precludes cooperation, the extreme of self-liberation de-
nies the social bond. Whereas the liberation is a member of the Com-
munity, one who escapes from the social bond has neither the freedom of
liberty nor the sustenance of communitas. Excesses of luxury mask the
final destruction of the Community.
PRESENT HUMAN CONDITION
What are the consequences of the transition from Community bonds
structured by a religious code of ethics to those structured by a political-
economic marketplace which are rational, contractual and legal in nature?
Anomie
Discontent grows during the disintegration of the Community. People
no longer accept the established code of ethics, the traditional and conven-
tional mores and folkways. Since social order prevails only when society
accepts a code of ethics instilling people's needs and satisfactions, with
heightened discontent the cohesion of the social order crumbles. The be-
liefs and practices a person learns from the Community make him the
embodiment of the "collective conscience." When the socialization pro-
cess collapses, norms and values break down, and the code of ethics is
rejected, Community enters a state of disintegration, a condition Emile
Durkheim calls anomie.3 '
Since the person cannot draw his moral sustenance from the Com-
munity, anxiety is heightened by the conflict between systems of belief-and
the resulting normlessness. Durkheim conceives three characteristics of
anomie in the subjective sense: a painful uneasiness or anxiety, a feeling
of separation from a group or isolation from social standards, and a feeling
of pointlessness because no definite goals exist. Anomie connotes a state
of confusion for the person. His needs are not sufficiently proportioned to
his means; his goals are not realized, and his activities lack direction. The
person experiences confusion, viz., a sense of rootlessness, meaningless-
ness, aimlessness and loss of orientation.
As anomie increases in the society, the person's sense of meaningless-
A concept was developed by Durkheim in 1951 to indicate the totality of beliefs and
practices of folkways and mores; he defines it as "a repository of common sentiments, a
wellspring from which each individual conscience draws its moral sustenance."
31 Id.
32 For a discussion of anomie as meaninglessness, see E. POWELL, supra note 28.
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ness heightens and a state of "selflessness" emerges.3 Upon the collapse
of the social order, the person wanders and wonders with persistent anomic
tension in a search for some meaning-giving experience. The loss of
Gemeinschaft and its social cohesion are accompanied by confusion, frus-
tration and anxiety. Bourgeois moralization is incomplete. Mobility and
dislocation from neighborhood and friends create disruptions of social pat-
terns which affect socialization, moralization or internalization of conven-
tional moral standards and loss of family solidarity.
The rootlessness and discord in social relationships heightens a sense
of anomie. The established code of ethics loses its meaning and power and
a fatalistic or nihilistic attitude results wherein conduct is no longer gov-
erned by a body of common values or morals. An acute sense of loneliness
occurs whereby people are separated and the design of principles and
norms shatters into autonomous fragments.
Disintegration of the Social Order
Individual experience is no longer rooted in a stable and integrated
social milieu and much of life's activity loses its sense and meaning. So-
rokin describes the trends of the disintegration of contemporary society as
follows:
(1) Sensate values will become. . devoid of any universal recognition and
binding power.
(2) Atomized Sensate values . will be stripped of anything divine, sa-
cred, and absolute.
(3) "World's conscience" will disappear.
(4) Contracts and covenants will lose the remnants of their binding power.
(5) Rude force and cynical fraud will become the only arbiters of all values
and of all interindividual and intergroup relationships.
(6) Freedom will become a mere myth. . . Inalienable rights will be alien-
ated; Declarations of Rights either abolished or used only as beautiful screens
for an unadulterated coercion.
(7) Governments will become more and more . . . tyrannical.
(8) The family will continue to disintegrate.
(9) The Sensate supersystem of our culture will become increasingly a
shapeless "cultural dumping place" . . . devoid of any unity.
(10) Its creativeness will continue to wane and wither . . . The place of
moral categoric imperatives will be occupied by progressively atomistic and
hedonistic devices.
(11) The production of the material values will decline, depressions will
grow worse, and the material standards of living will go down.
(12) Security of life and possessions will fade.
(13) Population will increasingly split.34
This point is discussed in S. DEGRAz1A, THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY: A STUDY OF ANOMIE
(1948), and R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1957).
u The statements are taken from the crises in P. SOROKIN, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS
699-701 (1962).
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With the disintegration of the social order, Community and social
concord give way to social discord. As Margaret Mead contends, when the
principles and norms of social order erode, "most of the subtle ways in
which women and men relate to each other in a more limited setting break
down." The conflict between the intimacy of interdependence and auton-
omy results in erotic excess, i.e., an orgy of escalating appetites. Such is
the human condition in contemporary society.
RESOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL NEED
Given the condition of apocalyptic discord and disintegration of the
Community, one raises the questions: How can social life become organ-
ized into increasingly complex structures of associations among men? How
can the principles of responsibility and reciprocity be restored for the reali-
zation of human rights and obligations?
Democratic Community: Realization of Responsibility and Accountability
Democratic Community occurs when "the spirit of religion combines
harmoniously with the spirit of liberty." 36 A democratic way of life requires
an individual who possesses in himself the authority, responsibility and
order necessary for the maintenance of his society, i.e., what Thomas Jef-
ferson calls the "virtuous individual."
In the Democratic Community, responsibility and accountability are
interdependent. Responsibility includes being responsive to and giving
account of the consequences of one's actions. According to Max Weber's
"Ethics of Responsibility," responsibility implies effectiveness and ac-
countability; one is responsible for the consequences of his acts regardless
of his intentions. Hence, responsibility does not relate primarily to the
self. 7 To respond is to be responsible to others; responsibility is incomplete
without reciprocity. The conditions of responsibility in the Democratic
Community are social and political. The responsible person depends on the
resources of the Community-the public condition for responsibility. The
Democratic Community rests upon the strength of its social bonds to facili-
tate the realization of human rights through responsible and reciprocal
commitment.
The Weltanschauung of democracy rests on the integration of human
rights and Community, viz., the social need. As Karl Mannheim states,
between human rights and social need lie "the basic virtues and values
which are the basis of the social order-brotherly love, mutual help, de-
cency, social justice, freedom, respect. '38
' Mead, A Proposal: We Need Taboos On Sex At Work, REDBOOK, April 1978, at 31.
3 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 12 (1840).
31 H. GERTH & C. MILLS, supra note 8, at 70-74.
K. MANNHEIM, DIAGNOSIS OF OuR TIME (1943).
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The Challenge
In America, the principles of the Democratic Community are not only
ideational but also codified into the moral ethic. In 1776 the Declaration
of Independence prescribed:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness-That to secure
these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Gov-
ernment becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to
alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation
on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
The United States Constitution, recognizing the principles of the Demo-
cratic Community, is unambiguous in its codification of human rights. The
first amendment provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an-establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.
The preservation and restoration of the Democratic Community is the
challenge of our time. It is our finest struggle to eclipse social. disintegra-
tion and to reestablish the principles of responsibility and reciprocity. The
realization of human rights depends upon our victory. We must share our
responsibility. "What country can preserve its liberties," asks Jefferson,
"if the rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve
the spirit of resistance. 3 9 We must not concede liberty. Our responsibility
implies Weber's Ethic: "The man who faces 'the fate of the times' is one
who possesses the trained relentlessness in viewing the realities of life, and
the ability to face such realities and to measure up to them inwardly."40
He who is not a witness of history denies self.
To have arrived on this earth. . only to depart through human arrogance,
would be the ultimate irony.
-Richard E. Leakey
' Letter from Thomas Jefferson to General William Smith (1787).0 1H. GERTH & C. MILLS, supra note 8.
